Theory suggests that endogenous borrowing constraints amplify the impact of external shocks on the economy. How big is the ampli…cation? In this paper, we quantitatively investigate this question in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints under two alternatives: (1) borrowing constraint endogenously depends on the borrowers'net worth (2) borrowing constraint is exogenous. Calibrating our model to the Japanese economy, we …nd evidence of signi…cant ampli…cation. Next, we apply our model to Japan and …nd that TFP ‡uctuations can well account for the boom and the bust of the Japanese economy during 1980 to 2000, and the impact is much more signi…cant when borrowing constraint is endogenous.
Introduction
"A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining, but wants it back the minute it begins to rain" : Mark Twain In the wake of the Japanese and the East Asian crisis of the nineties, there has been a resurgence of interest in the link between the asset market and the aggregate economy and the role played by endogenous borrowing constraints. The economic experience of Japan and East Asia in the periods just before and during the …nancial crisis is characterized by two distinct facts: (1) a sharp increase in real estate and asset prices in the years preceding the crisis followed by a signi…cant and prolonged decline during the crisis years and (2) a booming economy just before the crisis characterized by a growth rate exceeding the long run growth rate of the economy that suddenly gave way to a marked economic recession. Are these observations linked? Empirical studies have shown that in Japan and East Asia real estate comprises an important collateral asset so theory tells us to expect the …nancial accelerator mechanism to play a signi…cant role. Given the endogeneity of borrowing constraints, external shocks would have an ampli…ed e¤ect on the economy through ‡uctuations in asset values that translate to ‡uctuations in a …rm's ability to borrow which in turn would a¤ect business investment and output. The question is how big is the ampli…cation?
In this paper we quantitatively test the signi…cance of the …nancial accelerator in neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model. We consider two cases: one where borrowing constraint is endogenous and real estate comprises a part of the collateral asset and the second case is one where borrowing constraint is exogenously determined and does not depend on the wealth holding of the borrower. According to the …nancial accelerator theory, the e¤ect of a shock is much more ampli…ed in the former case as compared to the latter. We apply the models to data and quantitatively search for evidence of such ampli…cation.
The study of the …nancial accelerator in macro literature can be traced back to Irving Fisher (1933) 1 who stressed the importance of …nancial factors in the Great Depression. The formal dynamic general equilibrium modelling of the concept of …nancial accelerator began with Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler(1989) and has been extended by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) and Charles Carlstrom and Timothy Fuerst (1997) . Since then a host of business cycle researchers have shown the importance of asset price ‡uctu-ations in the real economy. Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1997) studied the role played by …nancial accelerator under alternative situations, including sticky prices and in a monetary model. Glenn Hubbard (1998) summarizes the empirical evidence gathered from various studies that establish the sensitivity of business investment to a …rm's net worth. Matteo Iacoviello (2005) and Matteo Iacoviello and Raoul Minetti (2006) study the link between ‡uctuations in house values and the aggregate economy.
The real challenge to the importance of …nancial accelerator came with Narayana Kocherlakota's(2000) study where he questions the quantitative magnitude of ampli…cation and shows that the ampli…cation caused by the …nancial accelerator is particularly sensitive to the factor shares. Our study is motivated by this challenge. We construct a fully calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with variable capital and land, allowing for heterogeneity amongst borrowers in terms of their borrowing constraint. We calibrate our model to the Japanese case and test for the degree of ampli…cation under alternative borrowing constraints. Next, we study the sensitivity of the magnitude of ampli…cation to alternative factor shares. Finally, we feed in exogenous ‡uctuations in TFP to our model and test to what extent our model can quantitatively replicate the Japanese experience during 1980 to 2000.
Given the economic experiences of Japan in the last two decades of the twentieth century, Japan looks like an ideal case for testing the …nancial accelerator theory . After a decade of boom in the eighties characterized by an average per capita GDP growth rate of 3.6% and a doubling of real estate prices between 1985 and 1991, the average growth rate of per capita GDP fell to .5% in the nineties and real estate prices declined to their pre-1980 level. This overall economic recession characterizing the nineties in Japan has been called "the lost decade" by Edward C. Prescott and Fumio Hayashi(2002) . Currently, there are two strands of literature on business cycle ‡uctuations in Japan. Most studies till date have concentrated on explaining the ‡uctuations in real economic aggregates. Explanations forwarded include ‡uctuations in …nancial factors including credit market ‡uctuations ( see for example Takeo Hoshi and Anil or Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzer(2003) and Levon Barseghyan (2006) ) and ‡uctuations in total factor productivity (Hayashi and Prescott (2002) . The study that comes closest to ours is by Kenneth Kasa (1998) who studies the impact of falling asset and land prices on welfare in Japan, Korea and Hong Kong but he takes the ‡uctuations in real estate prices as exogenous to the model. Quantitative studies on ‡uctuations in real estate prices are limited. Sami Alpanda (2006) looks at ‡uctuations in tax on land as a explanation for ‡uctuations in land prices. Tomoyuki Nakajima (2003) analyzes the importance of expectations in explaining the ‡uctuations in real estate prices.
The model we consider is a real business cycle model with heterogenous agents comprising of workers and entrepreneurs, and a government. The tax policy is such that the entrepreneurs can claim the interest paid on borrowed funds as a deduction from the taxable income for calculation of corporate income tax. Such a tax deduction cannot be claimed for funds collected through sale of equity hence entrepreneurs have a bias in favor of debt …nancing as opposed to equity …nancing. However, the …rms face an endogenous collateral constraint on borrowings which limits their ability to borrow. We consider a borrowing constraint of the "margin call" form where entrepreneurs can only borrow upto a fraction of their wealth where the fraction is commonly referred to as the loan-to-value ratio. This type of borrowing constraint speci…cation has gained ground in international macroeconomics literature (see Enrique Mendoza and Katherine Smith (2006) for a discussion of the "margin call" form). There are three exogenous shocks that a¤ect the economy at any period: shocks to productivity, shocks to loan to value ratio and exogenous changes in government expenditure. Given our model, any external shock has an ampli…ed and persistent impact on aggregate output through changes in wealth of an entrepreneur which a¤ects the maximum amount that an entrepreneur can borrow. Our model is similar to the credit cycle model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , henceforth referred to as KM. However, there are two important distinctions: we consider a "margin call" form of the borrowing constraint which is an ex-ante borrowing constraint as opposed to the ex-post borrowing constraint considered in KM; more importantly, KM assumes that entrepreneurs are more impatient than workers which leads to binding borrowing constraints. In our model, the binding borrowing constraints are a result of a tax policy rather than di¤erences in discount rate 2 .
Calibrating our model to the Japanese economy we …nd that the model with endogenous borrowing constraints result in signi…cant ampli…cation of TFP shocks. However, the degree of ampli…cation is sensitive to factor shares as suggested by Kocherlakota(2000) . The rate of ampli…cation decreases as the share of capital in output goes down.
We next calculate the time series of TFP ‡uctuations from the Japanese economy. Feeding in the TFP ‡uctuations in our model, we …nd that the model with endogenous borrowing constraints can explain a signi…cant portion of the ‡uctuation in output though the performance of the model with respect to ‡uctuations in land prices fall short when compared to the data.
We also feed in the TFP ‡uctuations in the model with exogenous borrowing constraints. The results reinforces the fact that the endogeneity of borrowing constraints lead to signi…cant ampli…cation of external shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The stylized facts from the Japanese economy during 1980 to 2000 are discussed in Section 2. We present the theoretical model in Section 3 and the quantitative results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 2 Alpanda (2006) also uses the same technique. 4 
Stylized facts from Japanese economy
We begin by tracing the ‡uctuations in per capita output in Japan during the period 1980 to 2000. The national income accounts data is collected from Hayashi and Prescott (2002) . In our analysis, the population comprises of working age population i.e. population in the age groups 20 to 69. The average growth rate of population is .78% and the average growth rate of per capita output is 2.2% which is slightly higher than the long term average growth rate of per capita output in United States which stands at 2%.
In Figure 1 -a we plot the per capita output detrended at 2.2%. After years of stable growth during 1980 to 1985, Japanese economy experienced an economic boom during 1986 to 1991 when output grew at a rate of 1.39% above trend. However, since 1991 the growth stalls and except for a brief recovery during 1994 to 1996, output continues to decline. During 1991 to 2000 the average growth rate of per capita output is 1.68% below trend.
In Figure 1 -b we plot the capital output ratio that registers a continuous increase throughout the eighties and the nineties. Capital output ratio increases from 1.74 in 1980 to 2.36 in 2000 exhibiting signi…cant capital deepening.
In Figure 1 -c we plot the share of non-residential land in total land where we normalize the total land holdings in the economy to 1. Non-residential land in our setup comprises of land used for cultivation and land underlying the non-residential buildings. Residential land is the land underlying residential buildings. We assume that the sum of non-residential and residential land in the economy is 1. The data is collected from Japan Statistical Yearbook . The share on non-residential land increases by .91% during 1986 to 1991 and eventually falls by 16.7% by 2000.
In Figure 1 -d we plot the index of urban land prices as collected from Japan Statistical Yearbook. In the yearbook, the urban land price index in year 2000 is taken as 100. For our analysis, we take the land price in year 1980 as 100. During the eighties the average growth rate of urban land prices is 7.6%. The trend continues till 1991 when land prices start falling. During the nineties urban land prices fall at an average rate of 4.24%.
Theoretical model
We model the Japanese economy as a heterogenous-agent economy model with two groups of in…nitely lived agents: entrepreneurs and workers. Entrepreneurs are of two types: type 1 produces residential services (or housing) and type 2 produces non-residential goods. To keep matters simple, we assume that a person is either born as an entrepreneur (either type 1 or type 2) or as a worker and it is not possible to switch types. We further assume that the fraction of workers and entrepreneurs of each type remain constant every period. In addition to the workers and the entrepreneurs, there exists an in…nite number of perfectly competitive …rms that use the residential services and non-residential goods as inputs to produce the aggregate consumption good y that is used for …nal consumption and investment. Lastly, there is a government that collects tax revenue, spends a part of it for government consumption and disburses the rest as transfers to the economic agents.
Workers are endowed every period with one unit of time. They spend a part of their time working for the entrepreneurs and the rest of the time is spent in leisure. There are two sources of income for the worker: wage income and interest income. After paying labor income taxes and taxes on interest income, the workers use the rest of their income to buy consumption goods and the remainder is saved.
The type 1 entrepreneurs begin any period t with certain amount of land holding. They own the technology to produce residential services denoted by y 1 which is produced using land and labor. For simplicity we do not introduce capital in production of residential services. The revenue earned from residential services is used by the entrepreneur to pay wages to the labor and the remainder is spent on consumption and investment in land. The entrepreneur can also borrow but they face a borrowing constraint which allows them to borrow only a fraction of their wealth.
The second group of agents are the entrepreneurs who own the production process to produce the non-residential goods denoted by y 2 . The type 2 entrepreneurs begin every period with a certain amount of capital and land..The entrepreneurs combine capital, land and labor to produce the non-residential goods, the returns to which are used for consumption and investment in capital and land. The type 2 entrepreneurs can borrow upto a certain fraction of their wealth every period.
Both groups of entrepreneurs have to pay corporate income taxes but can claim the interest paid on borrowed funds as a deductible from their taxable income. This "tax shelter" creates an incentive for the entrepreneurs to raise funds through debt …nancing as opposed to equity …nancing.
We further assume that entrepreneurs do not value leisure. This assumption is common in literature and has been used by Iacoviello (2005) , Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) amongst others.
The amount of land in the economy is constant and is normalized to one. The …nal good is treated as the numeraire so that wages, interest rate and prices are in terms of the …nal consumption good.
Let us begin with the economic problem of the representative worker. 
Workers
The representative worker's (denoted by a superscript w) problem is a standard one. Workers maximize the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility function given by
where E 0 is the expectations operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, c w t denotes consumption of the workers at time t; and h w t denotes the hours worked by the workers. The workers maximize the lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint:
where w t is the wage rate and r t is the interest rate on savings in units of …nal consumption good y. The tax on their labor income is ht ; and tax on their interest earnings is denoted by st . In addition, workers also get transfers T r w t from the government every period. Our description of the workers problem is di¤erent from other …nancial accelerator models like the ones in Iacoviello(2005) , Minetti and Iacoviello (2006) in that we do not have land in the workers'utility function. In earlier studies the description of the economy was such that the workers valued land for consumption and entrepreneurs value land only as an input. In our model we assume that the workers as well as the entrepreneurs both value residential services. The way we model this is by assuming that the …nal consumption good y in the economy that is consumed by workers and entrepreneurs is made up of both non-residential goods as well as residential services. In addition to the budget constraint, the workers also face non-negativity constraints every period.
Given the information listed above, we can summarize the representative worker's problem by the following set of …rst-order conditions, where Combining the equations we get:
Equation (5) tells us that in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure of the worker equals the after-tax marginal product of labor. Equation (6) tells us that in equilibrium, the present discounted value of lifetime utility that would ensue from withholding one unit of consumption today and saving it instead for consumption in future (after deducting for the tax on interest income earned) is equal to the marginal disutility that stems today from the lost consumption. Equation (7) is the workers' budget constraint.
Type 1 Entrepreneurs
The representative type one entrepreneur (denoted by a superscript 1) maximizes the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility:
where E 0 is the expectations operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, c
where y 1t is the amount of residential services produced at time t and p 1t is the price of residential services in terms of …nal consumption good. The entrepreneurs are assessed a tax on their corporate income at the rate yt : The entrepreneurs also get transfers T r
when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined by the net tangible asset holdings of the entrepreneur and
This collateral constraint is of the ex-ante form and is distinct from the expost borrowing constraint considered in literature where the borrowing limit is determined as a fraction of the present value of future wealth holdings.
Given the setup of our problem, we can show that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady state (please …nd the proof in Appendix 1).
The entrepreneur also faces a constraint in the form of the production technology that can be summarized by:
where A 1t is time varying productivity. We can summarize the representative type 1 entrepreneur's problem by the following set of …rst-order conditions, where Equation (12) re ‡ects the fact that in equilibrium, wage rate is equal to the after-tax marginal productivity of labor. Equation (13) gives us the equilibrium condition for investment in land by the entrepreneur, which essentially tells us that in equilibrium, the present discounted value of lifetime utility obtained by withholding one unit of consumption and instead investing it in land and deriving future consumption from it (after deducting the appropriate taxes) is equal to the loss in utility that ensues today due to consumption withheld. This is a standard condition except there are two sources of deriving bene…ts from investment in land: …rstly, the entrepreneur gets the bene…t of increased production when she uses investment today as an input in the production process tomorrow (this is re ‡ected in the marginal product of land), secondly, the entrepreneur can use the investment in land as a collateral asset that helps the entrepreneur in boosting her borrowing capability. This second source of bene…t that the entrepreneur derives by additional investment results from the collateral constraint being a function of the net worth of the entrepreneur and is unique to models with endogenous collateral constraints.
Type 2 Entrepreneurs
The economic problem of the type 2 entrepreneur is very similar to that of type 1.
The representative type two entrepreneur (denoted by a superscript 2) maximizes the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility:
where E 0 is the expectations operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, c 2 t denotes consumption of the entrepreneur at time t: The entrepreneur's maximize the lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint:
where y 2t is non-residential good produced at time t and p 2t is the price of the non-residential good in terms of …nal consumption good. The entrepreneurs are assessed a tax on their corporate income at the rate yt : The entrepreneurs also get transfers T r 2 t from the government every period. The entrepreneurs can claim the depreciated capital and the interest paid on borrowed funds as a deductible from the corporate income tax calculation as given by the expression l 2 t and k t+1 k t respectively). In addition to the budget constraint, the entrepreneurs also face the collateral constraint:
) when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined by the net tangible asset holdings of the entrepreneur and
The proof that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady state is same as for type one entrepreneur and is summarized in Appendix 1.
The production technology is given by:
where A 2t is time varying productivity. We can summarize the representative type 2 entrepreneur's problem by the following set of …rst-order conditions, where t 2 t is the lagrange multiplier attached to the entrepreneur's budget constraint at time t; and t 2t denotes the lagrange multiplier attached to the collateral constraint at time t: We denote the derivative of an utility function u 2 t (:) with respect to a variable z with u 2 zt (:) and the derivative of the production function F t (:) with respect to a variable z by F tz (:): Assuming entrepreneurs face an endogenous borrowing constraint, the …rst order conditions that de…ne the entrepreneurs'problem are:
The equations are similar to the ones described in Equations (12) and (13). The only additional equation is Equation (21) that gives us the equilibrium condition for investment in capital by the entrepreneur, which essentially tells us that in equilibrium, the present discounted value of lifetime utility obtained by withholding one unit of consumption and instead investing it in capital and deriving future consumption from it (after deducting the appropriate taxes) is equal to the loss in utility that ensues today due to consumption withheld.
Firms producing …nal goods
The pro…t maximizing problem of a representative …rm that produces the …nal good y is summarized by:
p it y it subject to the production constraint:
The necessary …rst order condition reduces to:
where iyt ; i 2 (1; 2) is the lagrange multiplier on the production technology constraint.
Government and Resource Constraints
The role of the government in my model is a passive one. Government collects tax revenues and spends it on expenditure and transfers back to the entrepreneurs and workers so as to balance the budget every period. Assuming that N it ; i 2 (1; 2) denotes the number of entrepreneurs of type i and N wt denotes the total number of workers in period t; the budget constraint of the government can be summarized as:
where T t denotes the aggregate transfer. We further assume that the share of transfers to workers and entrepreneurs in total transfers is …xed and is given by:
We close our model by summarizing the resource constraints every period:
Equation (27) summarizes the goods market clearing condition. Equation (28) summarizes the loan-market clearing condition and states that borrowings must be less than or equal to savings every period. Equation (29) is the labormarket clearing condition that says demand for labor by the entrepreneurs every period is less than or equal to supply of labor by workers. Equation (30) tells us that the sum of land held by the entrepreneurs must be less than the total endowment of land in the economy, which we assume is one unit every period.
Equilibrium
Given that the utility function of the workers and the entrepreneurs is strictly quasi-concave and the constraints are linear, the model has a unique equilibrium that is characterized by a set of allocation functions summarized by the vector of allocationsfc 
Quantitative Results
In this section, we calibrate our model to match the moments of the Japanese economy. Next, we solve for the decision rules and feed in exogenous shocks in our model to account for the observed economic ‡uctuations in Japan during 1980 to 2000
Model Propositions
We begin with a proposition that establishes the condition for borrowing constraints to bind in equilibrium. Note that we can only formally prove the proposition for the steady state.
Proposition 2 In the steady state, the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneur will hold with equality if and only if the tax charged on the interest earnings of the workers is less than the corporate income tax rate, i.e.
Proof. We provide a formal proof of the proposition in Appendix 1, but the idea is a simple one. The entrepreneurs have two ways to …nance their investment: equity-…nancing and debt-…nancing. Given all other things remain the same, entrepreneurs will prefer one mode of …nancing over the other if there are some tax advantages attached to one mode. Typically, government allows entrepreneurs to claim the interest paid on their borrowed funds as a deductible from their corporate income in calculation of the corporate income tax payment. Such an option is not allowed for equity-…nanced investment, which creates a bias in favor of debt-…nancing. The government, on the other hand, makes up partly for revenue loss due to this tax-shelter by charging a tax on the interest earnings of the workers who lend to the entrepreneurs. As we can show in the proof, the workers can pass on this tax to the entrepreneurs through the market interest rate which partly depends on the tax on interest earnings. So, essentially the entrepreneurs have to weigh the two taxes: the savings generated by the ability to deduct interest payments from corporate tax calculations and the expenses of tax on interest income that is often passed on to the entrepreneurs through the market interest rate. A rational entrepreneur will therefore favor debt …nancing as long as the savings of the tax shelter scheme outweigh the cost of having to bear the tax on interest earnings of the lenders. This would happen if the corporate income tax rate is higher than the tax rate on interest earnings, which is often the case.
When the two tax rates are equal, the entrepreneur is essentially indi¤erent between the two modes of …nancing, and when the corporate income tax rate is lower than the tax charged on interest earnings of the lenders, the entrepreneurs favor equity-…nancing. This last option is hard to come by in the real world but is de…nitely a theoretical possibility in which case the borrowing constraint does not hold for the entrepreneur and the model is no longer a relevant one.
Given that the borrowing constraint binds in the steady-state, we assume that it also binds in the neighborhood of the steady state and apply usual loglinearization techniques to solve for the decision rules.
Steady state and Calibration
At this point it is useful to look at the steady state equations that summarize the model.
For our future analysis we assume the following functional forms of our utility and production functions: 
& is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure of the worker. is the share of residential services in output. l1 is the share of land in residential services, k and l2 are the shares of capital and land in the nonresidential goods. For our analysis, we assume that the size of workers and both types of entrepreneurs is same and we normalize the size to one.
Given the functional forms and the long term growth rate of output and population, the steady state equations are summarized in Appendix 2:
The objective of the calibration exercise is to estimate the parameters of our model such that the moments of our model match the moments from data. We take the moments from Japanese data during the period 1980 to 1984 when Japan was growing at a steady pace and by many accounts (including Hayashi and Prescott (2002)) had reached a steady state. The data is from Hayashi and Prescott (2002) dataset which in turn is collected from Japan Statistical Yearbooks and the Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan. The dataset has become the standard in studies about Japanese economy and has been used by Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Chen(2006) amongst others. The average share of investment in output is .25 and the average share of government consumption in output is .14 during this period. The average capital output ratio is 1.8 which yields a depreciation rate = :1: The share of housing which we use as a proxy for residential services in output is .04 which yields = :04: The data for taxes is collected from Hiromitshu Ishi(1999). The average labor income tax rate in Japan h = 33%, the average corporate tax rate y = 49:5% and the tax rate on return to savings s = 19%: Note that the corporate income tax rate in Japan is much higher than the tax rate on interest on savings which makes borrowing constraint hold with equality in the steady state. For our analysis, we abstract from any changes in taxes, so taxes in my model are time-invariant.
The data on borrowings is collected from the Japan Statistical Yearbook. The net borrowings of the consumers for housing purposes is taken as a proxy for the share of borrowings of entrepreneur 1 in total borrowing so that b1 y = :45: Given the net borrowings of the non-corporate sector, we take the share of borrowings in output b2 y = 1:75: Note that Alpanda (2006) takes the share of aggregate borrowing in GDP in Japan to be 2.2 which matches the share of aggregate borrowing in our model which is the ratio of sum of borrowings of entrepreneur 1 and 2 to output. The value of residential land (taken as the value of land underlying residential buildings) as a ratio of output or ql1 y = 1:55 and the sum of the value of land underlying non-residential buildings and cultivated land is taken as the value of land held by type 2 such that ql2 y = 1:08: In our analysis, we assume that the economy is closed and that all entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints. In Japan, it is well documented that the small and the medium …rms face borrowings constraints and use their land holdings as a collateral. As for the bigger …rms, we assume that the ability to raise capital depends on their wealth holdings. This is not a very unrealistic assumption given the fact that the keiretsu or the …rms that had a preferred position in the Japanese loan markets were bigger …rms that had a good network based on reputation.
Given the value of land and share of borrowings of entrepreneur 1, 1 = :299 and given the capital output ratio, value of land held by entrepreneur 2 and We take the interest rate to be 5% and the rate of relative risk aversion = 1:5 that is common in literature. Further, the long term growth rate of per capita output g z = 2:2% and the long term growth rate of working population = :78% which yields = :99: Labor h = :33 which yields In our model, as opposed to the common symbol in macro literature, k denotes the share of capital in non-residential output, 1l denotes the share of land in housing or residential output, 2l denotes the share of land in nonresidential output and h denotes the share of labor in non-residential output.
The calibration exercise yields k = :3198; 1l = :4446; 2l = :0025 and h = :6777: Note that given the share of residential output in total output or = :04; the share of capital in total output y = (1 ) k = :3070;share of residential land in total output 1l = :0178; share of non-residential land in total output (1 ) 2l = :0024 and the share of labor in total output = (1 1l ) + (1 ) h = :6143 which adds up to 1:
The data for transfers is not available by employment or wealth cohorts. We assume that 80% of the total transfers go to the workers and the remaining goes to the entrepreneurs. We justify our …ndings by the fact that a larger portion of transfers in developed countries typically go to the workers and medium businesses as compared to big businesses. Literature on transfer payments by employment or wealth cohorts in general is limited. Studies on US economy suggests that about 75% to 90% of social security transfers go to the poorer households. We check the robustness of our results for alternative share of transfers and …nd our results are not sensitive to alternative shares. The steady state values and the calibrated parameters are summarized in Table1 and Table  2 .
Impulse responses
Given the theoretical proposition, borrowing constraint will bind in the steady state as long as y > s :
We assume that the borrowing constraint binds in the neighborhood of the steady state and solve for the decision rules using the technique of loglinearization outlined in Robert King, Charles Plosser and Sergio Rebelo (1988). The set of log-linearized equations that we solve to derive our decision rules are summarized in Appendix 2.
We denote the deviations of the variables from their steady state by a tilda where:
2t 2 e g t = log g t log g
We assume that the deviations in exogenous variables follow a vector autoregressive process of order one. Given the time series of estimated productivities, the loan to value ratios and government consumption, we estimate: We next plot the impulse response of output, land price, labor and capital to a 1% positive shock to productivities A 1 and A 2 and a 1% positive shock to the loan to value ratios 1 and 2 :
4.3.1 Impulse response : Ampli…cation and endogeneity of borrowing constraint
As Figure 2 -a depicts, a 1% positive shock to A 1 increases output by .065% and land prices by .005% at impact. The e¤ect is much smaller if we consider an exogenous borrowing constraint. As depicted in Figure 2 -b, a 1% positive shock to A 1 increases output by .055% . However, land prices fall by .038% on impact.
The result is similar when we consider a 1% positive shock to A 2 : As Figure  3 -a depicts output increases by 1.7% and land price increases by .2% on impact before the e¤ects start diminishing. When we consider borrowing constraint to be exogenous, output increases by 1.4% and land price decreases by 1.2%. This is depicted in Figure 3 -b.
Given our model parameters as calibrated to the Japanese economy we thus …nd evidence of ampli…cation when borrowing constraint is endogenous.
Apart from A 1t and A 2t ; ‡uctuations in the loan to value ratio 1t and 2t also a¤ect real macroeconomic variables. In Figures 4-a and 4-b , we plot the impulse responses of a 1% positive shock to the loan to value ratio Due to a 1% positive shock to 1 output falls by 4.2% and land price falls by 3.8%. At the same time a 1% positive shock to 2 results in a .8% fall in output and a .5% decline in land price.
The response to a positive shock to loan to value ratio generates a decline in labor and output as opposed to an increase. The result follows from the fact that an increase in the loan to value ratio has a dominant wealth e¤ect on the workers which results in an increase in consumption of leisure , a normal good. This results in reduced labor supply that given predetermined capital stock and land for production, results in a decrease in output.
Impulse response: Sensitivity of ampli…cation to factor shares
One of the main arguments forwarded by Kocherlakota(2000) is that the neoclassical general equilibrium models with credit constraints lose their power of ampli…cation as factor shares change. More speci…cally, the decline in share of capital in output results in a decline in ampli…cation. We test this …nding in our model. We keep the factor share of land the same as before and reduce the share of capital k to .2 (a measure similar to Kocherlakota(2000) ).
Hence the new set of factor shares are : f k = :2; l1 = :4446; l2 = :0025; h = :8g:
In Figures 5-a and 5-b , we plot the impulse response of a 1% positive shock to A 1 in a model with endogenous and a model with exogenous borrowing constraint respectively. In the former case, output increases by .064% and land price increases by .002%. In the latter case when borrowing constraint is exogenous, output increases by .061% and land price registers a fall by .008%.
As for a 1% positive shock to A 2 ; output in a model with endogenous borrowing constraint increases by 1.7% and land price increases by .2%. In comparison, in a model with exogenous borrowing constraint, output increases by 1.6% and land price falls by .025% as depicted in Figure 6 -a and 6-b.
Hence as compared to the results when k = :3198; reducing k to :2 reduces the degree of ampli…cation generated by an endogenous borrowing constraint.
One possible explanation of this sensitivity might be that the share of capital in output comprises a part of the entrepreneurial return. In Kocherlakota(2000) , share of capital was the only entrepreneurial return. In our model, entrepreneurial return comprises of share of land and share of capital in output. Financial accelerator works through its impact on entrepreneurial net worth and consequently its impact on business investment. When the return to business investment in total output is lower we would expect the …nancial accelerator mechanism to lose some of its amplifying power. This is what we see when we reduce k .
Application to Japan
The results from plotting impulse responses indicate that a model with endogenous borrowing constraints amplify the impact of external shocks on the economy. We next apply the general equilibrium model with endogenous borrowing constraints discussed above to the Japanese economy during 1980 to 2000. Our objective is to see to what extent endogeneity of the borrowing constraint aggravated the economic situation in Japan. For our analysis, we concentrate on ‡uctuations in total factor productivity which by many accounts was one of the primary reasons behind the boom and bust of the Japanese economy.
For our analysis we assume that A 1t = A 2t for every t which is the aggregate total factor productivity. The intuition is that production technology for producing residential services and non-residential goods are both subject to the same technology shock, which macro literature often refers to as a country-wide technology shock (as opposed to sector-speci…c technology shock).
Given the calibrated parameter values and data on capital output ratio, share of land in non-residential sector, share of land in residential sector and labor we calculate T F P or the Solow Residual. Figure 7 shows the ‡uctuation in detrended productivity over 1980 to 2000. Total factor productivity continuously grows above the long term growth rate of 2.2% between 1986 and 1991. In 1991, the growth rate of total factor productivity starts declining and except for a brief respite during 1994 to 1996, growth rate of TFP continues to decline till 2000.
We feed in the time series of TFP thus estimated in a model with endogenous borrowing constraints and compare the results with the case when borrowing constraint is exogenous.
In Figures 8-a to 8-d , we plot the predictions of feeding in time series of TFP in our model. We summarize our …ndings in Table 3 -a and 3-b.
We divide 1980 to 2000 in two sub-periods: the boom years of 1986 to 1991 and the recession years of 1991 to 2000.
The boom years of the Japanese economy are characterized by an 8.4% increase in per capita output accompanied by a 35.5% increase in land price between 1986 to 1991. The period also witnessed an increase in non-residential land holding by .91% and a capital deepening such that capital output ratio increased from 1.8 in 1986 to 1.9 in 1991.
How well does TFP ‡uctuations account for these facts?
TFP ‡uctuations in a model with endogenous borrowing constraint results in an increase in output per capita by 5.7% as compared to 4.9% in a model with exogenous borrowing constraints. Land prices increase by 1.46% in the former case. However, in the latter case it registers a decline by 1.8%. In case of nonresidential land, we …nd that a model with endogenous borrowing constraint results in an increase by 11.33% while a model with exogenous borrowing constraint predicts an increase by 8.65%. With respect to non-residential land holdings, the model predictions are much higher as compared to data. We suspect that in the real world, land is not very easily tradable as there are zoning laws and restrictions that prevent residential land from being costlessly converted to non-residential land. Our model did not have any such restrictions and consequently the shift in land holdings between residential and non-residential use is much more easy. In this paper for the sake of brevity we abstract from introducing any zoning laws but it can be easily incorporated in our model by including an adjustment cost of transfer of land between residential and non-residential uses with a high adjustment cost re ‡ecting steeper zoning laws.
Finally, as far as the capital output ratio is concerned, the ratio increases from 1.72 to 1.77 when the borrowing constraint is endogenous but remains constant at 1.78 when the borrowing constraint is exogenous.
Next we look at the recession years which are characterized by a 14.3% drop in per capita output accompanied by a 48% drop in land prices and a 16.7% decline in non-residential land. Capital output ratio on the other hand increases from 1.9 to 2.36.
In a model with endogenous borrowing constraints, TFP ‡uctuations predict a 20.8% drop in output accompanied by a 4.8% drop in land prices. Nonresidential land falls by 37.1% and contrary to data, capital output ratio falls from 1.77 to 1.59. In our model with endogenous borrowing constraints, the e¤ect of TFP on business investment is greater than the e¤ect of TFP on output. This explains why we get a decline in capital output ratio in response to a decline in TFP in contrast to data where there is a capital deepening.
When borrowing constraint is exogenous, output drops by 18.1%. However, land price increases by 8.89%, a prediction opposite to that of data. Nonresidential land falls by 28.9% while capital deepens such that the capital output ratio increases from 1.78 to 1.8.
Our results indicate that the impact of ‡uctuations in TFP get ampli…ed when borrowing constraints are endogenous. Increases in TFP in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints resulted in an increased boom of the economy which would have been much lower had the borrowing constraint been exogenous. This blessing became a curse during the nineties when endogeneity aggravated the negative impact of falling TFP. Our model falls short in explaining ‡uctuations in land prices. The magnitude of change in price of land in our model is much smaller than that witnessed in data and even increasing the persistence of the TFP process does not improve the model predictions with regard to land prices. This result is consistent with the works of Nakajima (2003) who …nds that a model with rational expectations cannot account for ‡uctuations in real estate prices in Japan.
In our model, TFP ‡uctuations alone have not been able to generate signi…-cant ‡uctuations in land prices. We do have rational expectations in our model. That begs the question: is ‡uctuations in land price in Japan really a bubble phenomenon which cannot be explained by economic fundamentals (in our case productivity shocks)? Or is it sensitive to expectations speci…cations and if we had adaptive expectations instead of rational expectations framework, we would have better results?
This analysis is outside the scope of this paper and we leave it for the future.
Conclusion
A wide spectrum of theoretical studies suggest that in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints small shocks can have a much ampli…ed and persistent impact on the economy. The mechanism is a simple one: exogenous shocks lead to changes in the borrower's net worth. Given endogenous borrowing constraint, ‡uctuations in a borrowers net worth translates to reduced funds for business investment which magni…es the impact of a small shock. The popular name of this mechanism is : …nancial accelerator.
However quantitative studies have posed quite a challenge for the …nan-cial accelerator mechanism. Kocherlakota (2000) showed that the ampli…cation might be quite small and is very sensitive to factor shares.
That leaves us with a question: quantitatively how important is the …nancial accelerator mechanism? The question has assumed particular signi…cance in the aftermath of the Japanese and the East Asian crisis which were characterized by signi…cant ‡uctuations in the real estate and asset prices along with ‡uc-tuations in real economic aggregates. Given the …nancial environment where debt …nancing is a common way of raising funds for investment and …rms often borrow against a collateral, the two phenomenon might be intrinsically linked. We expect external shocks to cause ‡uctuations in real estate and asset prices which would then get transmitted to the real economy resulting in ampli…ed ‡uctuations of output.
In this paper, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints to quantitatively test the importance of the …nancial accelerator mechanism. We allow entrepreneurs to borrow funds for investment. However there is an upper limit on the amount the entrepreneurs can borrow that is determined by the net worth of the entrepreneurs. Calibrating our model to the Japanese economy we …nd that the magnitude of ‡uctuations in real estate prices and per capita output in response to a shock to total factor productivity is much more ampli…ed when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined by the borrowers'net worth as opposed to an exogenously determined cap.
We do …nd that the degree of ampli…cation is sensitive to factor shares. We tested a case where the share of capital in output was reduced as compared to our benchmark case. We …nd that the degree of ampli…cation goes down in the former case as compared to the latter.
Next, we applied our model to Japan. Our objective was to see to what extent endogeneity of borrowing constraint was instrumental in magnifying the boom and the bust of the Japanese economy during 1986 to 2000. We …nd that our model with endogeneity registers greater increase and decline in output per capita in response to TFP ‡uctuations as compared to a model where borrowing constraints are exogenous. However, the model falls short of explaining the land price ‡uctuations of the same magnitude as witnessed in data, though endogeneity does amplify the impact of TFP on land prices. This suggests the possibility of a bubble which renders land price not so dependent on economic fundamentals, or it opens up the possibility of a need to modify the model, with one possible modi…cation being in the structure of expectations as suggested by Nakajima (2003) .
One assumption in our model was that all entrepreneurs are subject to a binding borrowing constraint. An area for future research might be to relax this assumption and test a case where only a fraction of the entrepreneurs at any time face binding borrowing constraint. It would be interesting to see to what extent the e¤ect of the external shock would get ampli…ed in such a case. We suspect the e¤ect to be smaller than what we …nd and we also suspect the e¤ect would be sensitive to the degree of interaction between the constrained and the unconstrained entrepreneur. For example, if the output of the credit constrained entrepreneur is an important input used by the unconstrained entrepreneur, we might expect the e¤ect of TFP shocks to be bigger. A detailed general equilibrium model in this area would help us …nd answers. 
Given the set of deterministic equations, and the set of expectational equations, the set of unknowns is summarized by the vector: f e w t ; e c w t ; e h w t ; e y t ; e T t ; e c 1t ; e c 2t ; e 1t ; e 2t ; e h 1t ; e h 2t ; e k t+1 ; e s t+1 ; e b 1t+1 ; e b 2t+1 ; e l 1t+1 ; e l 2t+1 ; e r t ; e q t g:
We have a set of 19 equations and 19 unknowns so we can uniquely determine the decision rules of the model.
